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Fear of an Article V Convention
Arthur H. Taylor
I. INTRODUCTION
Article V of the U.S. Constitution provides that,
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the
Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall
call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case,
shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution,
when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States,
or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode
of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress . . . .1

As is well known, there are two ways provided to amend the United
States Constitution. The first is to propose the amendment by the twothirds vote of both the House and the Senate. The second is for twothirds of the states to call for a convention, with the convention then
proposing the amendment. In either case, Article V provides that any
amendment, before effective, shall first be “ratified by the Legislatures of
three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths
thereof.”2
All the amendments to the Constitution to date have been proposed
through Congress. A convention of the states has never been convened.
Because the second method of proposing amendments has lain dormant
for over two centuries now, and given some of the legal questions
surrounding its use, there has grown a substantial fear of an Article V
convention. This paper examines those fears, identifies their substantive
content, and then attempts to provide a practical assessment of the real
risk associated with an Article V convention.

1. U.S. CONST. art. V.
2. Id.
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II. AMENDMENT PROCESS
The Constitution expressly provides for two means of amendment.
There is also a third method, however, which, while not expressly
provided for, has become a central part of the U.S. Constitutional
process: to “amend” the Constitution via decision by the United States
Supreme Court.
No formal method is required to propose an amendment through the
Supreme Court. Any litigant may do so. Upon the majority vote of the
justices, the amendment becomes the “highest law of the land.” While
the process of changing the Constitution through the judiciary is not
termed by participants as an amendment, it is substantively the
equivalent. Currently there is no real challenge to the Court’s authority to
so act, and all the branches of government, both state and federal, yield
to and support the changes in the Constitution by the Supreme Court thus
enacted.
Two points are useful before giving further review to amendments
through the judiciary. First, it is conceded that judicial amendments,
unlike Congressional or convention-based ones, must first find their basis
in some existing Constitutional language. An amendment proposed in
Congress or in a convention needs no prior Constitutional reference point
to justify its proposing. While this distinction is real, over time it has less
and less significance. Judicial amendments tend to be accretive—that is
one leads to yet another. So the Constitutional reference point required
for judicial amendments can be the Constitutional text itself, or as is
more commonly the case now, a prior Supreme Court interpretation of
the Constitution. Over time, therefore, the body of potential reference
points for judicial amendments grows very large. While the judicial
amending process can tend to be both slower and less noticeable, it is
every bit as potent. The end result can be essentially identical as though
an amendment were made into the text of the Constitution itself through
an Article V Congressional or convention amendment. In fact, in one
regard a judicial amendment is of even greater authority than a
Congressional or convention amendment given that the latter must
survive a first round of judicial interpretation before the basic meaning is
fully known, whereas a judicial amendment has already endured that
process at the time of its birth.
Second, the difference in scope of what may thus be proposed as an
amendment through Congress or a convention compared to the judiciary
is hypothetically large, but practically insignificant. The equalizer of the
two is the political climate of the time. Both means of amendment are
ultimately dependent on some political support for their position. A
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Congressional or convention amendment will depend upon the support of
the people, expressed through various representatives. A judicial
amendment will depend upon the support of the judges, drawn from the
citizenry of the country, but generally independent and unaccountable.
All amendments will require some fundamental popular support.
Amendments through the judiciary are least dependent on support of the
people and may actually precede to some degree full societal acceptance.
Viewed in this context then, the scope of judicial amendments may be
considered broader than those possible through Congress or a
convention, rather than the other way around.
The central point, however, is that the mere hypothetical difference
in the amending scope of the two processes is largely irrelevant, given
the political underpinning required of either. An amendment seeking
birth is far more dependent on finding a “will” than it is on finding a
“way.” When the “will” or political support is found, the “way” through
Congress, the States (convention) or the Judiciary can be created.
In summary then, the requirement that a judicial amendment be
founded in Constitutional text is minimized as the successive, multiple
interpretations over time provide ample reference points for the
proposing of the next judicial amendment. While this might slightly
decrease the range of amendments which can viably be proposed, the less
burdensome requirement of popular support necessary for a judicial
amendment tends to equalize if not more than offset such a constraint.
Since the Constitution can only be amended through a compound
process, that is, an amendment to be effective must be both “proposed”
and “ratified,” the relative ease or difficulty of doing so through one
process versus another can accurately be assessed only on a compound
basis as well.
For ease of reference, amendments through the first two methods—
Congress, and a convention of the states—shall hereafter be referred to
as “democratic amendments,” since they are subjected fully to the
American democratic process. Amendments through the third method
shall be hereafter referred to as “judicial amendments,” since they are
proposed by litigants and enacted by judges without the vote of elected
representatives of the people.
III. AMENDMENT FILTERS
The amendment process might be viewed as one of legal filtering of
political ideas. Viewed under this model, there are two primary filters
established before a democratic amendment becomes law. The first filter
is the amendment proposal. Absent a vote to propose an amendment,
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there is no authority for any democratic process to approve it and thus it
cannot become law. Either Congress or a convention of the states must
act first before any democratic amendment can be enacted.
The second filter is the States. Whether voiced through the vote of
the state legislature or a state convention, the assent of three-fourths of
the states is required for a democratic amendment under Article V.
These two filters act separately. Either can prevent a political idea
from becoming a part of the Constitution. They are designed as a dual
check and balance against ultimately unwise or otherwise harmful
amendments with momentary popular support.
A judicial amendment, however, is structured so as to enable
individual citizens to propose amendments, without filtering. Judicial
amendments thus effectively have but one filter of any kind in place—
the majority vote of the Supreme Court. While this is not a democratic
filter, it prevents any proposed amendment from becoming law unless
the judgment of those appointed to serve as Supreme Court justices agree
that it is a good idea.
IV. RISKS OF OVER- OR UNDER-FILTERING
The democratic amendment filters by their nature and design make it
more difficult for an amendment to be proposed and passed. Over time,
these filters may tend to over- or under-restrict the volume and kind of
political ideas which can pass through them. The Founding Fathers felt it
essential that the Constitution be capable of amendment.3 In fact, through
the Bill of Rights they immediately proceeded to make such
amendments. While undoubtedly it can be argued that the Constitution
should not be amended frequently or easily, it is equally clear that the
amendment process was intended to be available when and as needed.
For the purposes of this comment, and for convenience, instead of
attempting to cite actual, specific, attempted amendments and whether or
not those amendments should or should not have been adopted, I will
simply refer to theoretically appropriate amendments as “necessary
amendments” and theoretically inappropriate amendments as “adverse
amendments.”
An analysis of the filtering process will identify two kinds of risk—
the over- and under-filtering of proposed amendments. Over-filtering is
when necessary amendments are either not proposed or not ratified. That
is, they are filtered out by one or both of the two filters. Similarly, underfiltering should be understood as a state where adverse amendments are

3. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 85 (Alexander Hamilton).

407]

FEAR OF AN ARTICLE V CONVENTION

411

both proposed and ratified. The remaining two scenarios, in which
necessary amendments are both proposed and ratified, or adverse
amendments are prevented by either filter, are of no consequence for this
discussion since that is as one would hope it to be. Only the risk of overfiltering (preventing a necessary amendment), or under-filtering (failing
to prevent an adverse amendment) are of significance for our purposes.
Of course, all this discussion so far relates only to democratic
amendments. But the risk of over- or under-filtering, at least as described
so far, is measured by the result, not the process. Thus a necessary
judicial amendment that fails, or an adverse judicial amendment that is
enacted by the Supreme Court are of the same moment as over- or underfiltered democratic amendments, at least without regard to the proper
process or role, democratic or otherwise, for the creation of
Constitutional amendments.
While opposite sides of the same coin, the risk of over- and underfiltering are in fact significantly different. For now, however, my focus is
on the risk of under-filtering, that is, the failure to prevent enactment of
an adverse amendment, since this is the predominant fear of an Article V
convention.
V. UNDER-FILTERING, A COMPOUND EVENT RISK,
AND PROBABILITY THEORY
The under-filtering risk of a democratic amendment is a joint
probability risk. That is, the risk of an adverse democratic amendment
not being filtered out is the result of two related but separate risks: the
risk of an adverse democratic amendment being proposed and the risk of
an adverse democratic amendment being ratified. Both events must occur
for the risk to be realized. Mathematical probability theory can be
employed to better explain the true scope and dynamics of this process.4
Probability theory indicates that the likelihood of any event (e3)
occurring, which is the necessary and sufficient result of two other
events, e1 and e2, is the product of the same. Where the second event
occurring is dependent or conditional on the first having already
occurred, the joint probability is expressed as follows: P(e3) = P(e1) x
P(e2/e1). Here, P(e3) represents the under-filtering risk of an adverse
democratic amendment becoming law, P(e1) represents the risk of an
4. Mathematical probability theory can here be used to better clarify the comparative
amendment risks, and specifically identify and measure the added risk, if any, associated with the
convening of a convention of the states. It should be remembered that the purpose for its use is to
define and measure the risk of an adverse amendment becoming law in the event a convention “runs
away.” This is the predominant fear expressed regarding a convention. Carefully applied probability
theory can both define and measure how great this risk really is.
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adverse democratic amendment being proposed, and P(e2) represents the
risk of an adverse democratic amendment being ratified. Put into words,
this means the probability of an adverse amendment becoming law
(P(e3)) is equal to the probability that an adverse amendment will be
proposed (P(e1)) multiplied against the probability that such an
amendment, if proposed, will then be ratified. This is the mathematical
equation for the under-filtering risk of an adverse democratic amendment
(“Under-filtering Risk Equation”). Probability theory also states that
P(en) < 1, where en represents any event.5 Empowered by this knowledge
of probability, we can mathematically measure the impact of a “runaway
convention” on the overall under-filtering risk of an adverse democratic
amendment becoming law.
A “runaway convention,” as defined here, shall refer to a convention
which fails to filter any adverse democratic amendment. In the extreme,
it represents a scenario where all the delegates of the convention agree to
vote for each others’ proposed amendments without limitation or
qualification of any kind. There is no chance that an adverse amendment
will not be voted worthy of proposal to the States. In terms of the math,
then, the probability of an adverse amendment being proposed in a
runaway convention is necessarily equal to one (Lim P(e1) = 1).
This, however, only defines the limit to the probability of that first
event (Lim P(e1)), the runaway convention’s proposal to the States of an
adverse democratic amendment. To determine the impact of a runaway
convention on P(e3) we need to take the limit of both sides of the Underfiltering Risk Equation as an Article V convention “runs away”, which
yields the following: Lim(convention runs away) P(e3) = Lim(convention runs away) P(e1)
x Lim(convention runs away) P(e2 / e1). To simplify the notation, we will use
“Law” as a substitute notation for “e3”, “Prop” (proposed) for “e1”, and
“Ratf” (ratified) for “e2 / e1”. To restate our Under-filtering Risk
Equation then, we have Lim(convention runs away) P(Law) = Lim(convention runs away)
P(Prop) x Lim(convention runs away) P(Ratf). Because P(Ratf) is already defined
as an event conditioned upon the happening of e1, changes in the
probability of e1 do not impact the probability of P(e2 / e1). Thus the
Lim(convention runs away) P(e2 / e1) simply equals the P(e2 / e1), or P(Ratf), and is
unaffected by the fact that the convention ran away. In layman’s terms,
the running away of a convention does not have an impact on the
probability of an amendment being ratified once proposed.
Simplifying the under-filtering risk equation with the limit of both
sides as a convention runs away therefore yields the following:
Lim(convention runs away) P(e3) = 1 x P(e2 / e1). Simplifying further, Lim(convention

5. In other words, the probability of an event’s occurrence is no higher than 100%.
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runs away) P(e3) = P(e2 / e1) = P(Ratf). This reveals to us the obvious, that the
probability of an adverse amendment becoming law in the event a
convention “runs away” is the probability that the amendment is then
ratified.
So, through use of probability theory and limits, we can measure the
under-filtering risk of an adverse democratic amendment becoming law,
assuming that a convention runs away, as equal to P(Ratf), which is the
probability that it is then ratified.
By comparison, the judicial under-filtering risk of an adverse
amendment is simply P(e4), where e4 represents the event of the Supreme
Court deciding in favor of an adverse judicial amendment to the
Constitution. This is so because there is no filter with the Supreme Court
in terms of what can be proposed as a judicial amendment. Anything can
be proposed, but it will have no impact unless the Supreme Court decides
to adopt the amendment. To be sure, this vote may require several
separate actions by the Supreme Court, such as granting certiorari,
supporting standing, and ultimately ruling favorably on the merits.
In summary, then, the under-filtering risk of an adverse democratic
amendment—with a runaway convention—is measured as P(e2 / e1), or
P(Ratf), the likelihood that the States will ratify an adverse amendment,
while the under-filtering risk of a judicial amendment is measured as
P(e4), the likelihood that the Supreme Court will decide in favor of an
adverse judicial amendment. (Of course, if a convention does not
runaway, then the under-filtering risk of an adverse democratic
amendment remains at P(e1) x P(Ratf), where P(e1) remains the
probability of an adverse democratic amendment being proposed by a
convention.)
A couple of examples will highlight the comparative risks of P(Ratf)
and P(e4). Let us assume that the recent decision in Lawrence v. Texas6
constitutes an adverse judicial amendment establishing a U.S.
Constitutional right to engage in private, consensual sodomy.7 This, then,
was an amendment proposed by Lawrence without filtering.8 The risk,

6. 595 U.S. 558 (2003).
7. “Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in
their conduct without intervention of the government.” Id. at 575 (2003).
8. The openness of the courts to judicial constitutional amendments based on a single
individual’s “search for greater freedom” couldn’t have been stated more plainly than it was in
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003). “Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in
its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did not presume to have this
insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once
thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in
every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom.”
As indicated earlier, some argue that the scope of an adverse amendment, where only interpretive
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before the Supreme Court actually decided that such a judicial
amendment would be approved, is denoted as P(e4)(private, consensual sodomy
protected). Assuming a runaway convention at the extreme, and that a
private, consensual sodomy amendment, equal in scope and content as
the Lawrence holding, is approved at the convention, then the risk that
this democratic amendment would be approved is P(Ratf) (private, consensual
sodomy protected). The key question in this example, assuming a runaway
convention, then, becomes this: which risk is greater, P(e4)(private, consensual
sodomy protected), or P(Ratf) (private, consensual sodomy protected)? Is it more likely the
Supreme Court would approve such an amendment, or three-fourths of
the States? Of course, in this case we have the benefit of hind-sight to
conclude that it is probably substantially more likely that the Supreme
Court would approve such an amendment than would the States, even
with a runaway convention.
What if we take a hypothetical that has not yet been decided? What
of a U.S. Constitutional amendment ensuring gays and lesbians the right
to marry? Which seems greater, the risk that the Supreme Court would
approve such an amendment proposed by litigants, P(e4)(gay and lesbian marriage
protected), or the risk that three-fourths of state legislatures would approve
such an amendment proposed by a runaway convention P(Ratf)(gay and
lesbian marriage protected)?
In both cases one would probably conclude that the current risk of an
adverse judicial amendment is much higher than the risk of an adverse
democratic amendment, even with a runaway convention that filters no
amendments of any kind. Of course, if the convention did filter some
amendments—if it was not a runaway convention—then the comparative
risk of an adverse judicial amendment would be even greater.
The whole point is that the significance of a runaway convention,
assuming that one should ever occur, has been vastly overstated.
Practically speaking, a runaway convention means at the extreme that
one of two filters is eliminated, and that the risk of an adverse democratic
amendment has increased—at the very most—to equal the risk that the
States would ratify such an amendment. This risk in the current political
climate is—depending on one’s political view and definition of an
adverse amendment—still, by comparison, substantially lower than the
risk of an adverse judicial amendment. Furthermore, because
changes are being made, is less than the scope of an adverse amendment where the text itself may be
changed. The perimeter of interpretive changes however, is self-expanding. As Lawrence
demonstrates, one interpretation enables another and yet another. Given ample time, the perimeters
have opportunity to be essentially equal in scope. The real difference, then, is not the scope of
potential amendments that can be made, whether through the democratic or judicial process, but
whether one can be made quickly in a few years through a democratic amendment, or more slowly
but ever as surely given decades of accretive judicial decisions.

407]

FEAR OF AN ARTICLE V CONVENTION

415

amendments “proposed” through the judiciary have the same
characteristics of a runaway convention (i.e., any and all amendments
may be proposed) the convening of a modern-day convention will do
little more to put the Constitution at risk than the advent of modern-day
judicial activism has already done. Said another way, through judicial
activism we already have all the risks of a convention but none of the
benefits. Only if one believes it is more likely that three-fourths of the
states will ratify an adverse democratic amendment than it is that five
justices will approve an identical adverse judicial amendment should
there exist a fear of a convention.
The rational fear, if any, of a convention should be reduced to this:
Those who believe three-fourths of the States are more likely than the
Supreme Court to approve an adverse amendment should legitimately
fear an Article V convention. Conversely, those who believe threefourths of the States are more likely than the Supreme Court to approve
needed amendments should favor an Article V convention. The debate to
date has been misrepresented as consisting of either the retention or
abandonment of the first filter to prevent the proposal of an adverse
amendment. That debate ignores the fact that our system already includes
a wide-open amendment proposing process through the judiciary.
Continuing the debate of a filtered versus non-filtered process for
proposing amendments is clearly outdated. The process for proposing
amendments to the U.S. Constitution is now wide-open. The typical way
of analyzing an Article V convention is premised upon the explicit twopronged method for amending the Constitution set forth in Article V. The
amendment process through the judiciary, however, is just as real and
widely accepted (that is, legally followed). Once one concedes that there
are three legal means of amending the Constitution, the analysis of an
Article V convention dramatically changes.
The real debate then is not one regarding what a convention could or
would propose, but who should effect the ratification of any amendment:
the Supreme Court or three-fourths of the States? Those relentlessly
holding to their fears of an Article V convention are principally of two
groups: (1) those who actually prefer the Supreme Court as the
amendment ratifying body, and (2) those who oppose judicial activism,
but seem to be in political and legal denial, hoping for some undefined
and undeveloped resolution of their fears of judicial activism. This latter
group, while opposing a convention of the states, nonetheless proffers no
practical solution to the problem of judicial amendments. Conversely,
those favoring an Article V convention are either (1) those who prefer
the States as the appropriate ratifying body, or (2) those who criticize, yet
concede that the Supreme Court has now become the Supreme Branch.
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This second group also maintains that an Article V convention is the only
remaining check provided to the States against a runaway Federal
government. Under our current system of constitutional jurisprudence,
the rational fear, if any, of an Article V convention should be
predominantly political, not legal.
The unwitting consequence of this fear, regardless of its origin, is to
provide support for the political base preferring preservation of the
current ratification authority of the Supreme Court. Whether clothed in
political opposition, or unreasoned denials of current Constitutional
reality, fear of an Article V convention inadvertently strengthens the
power of the Supreme Court, and lessens the power of the States.
VI. DEFINITION OF ADVERSE AMENDMENT
The notion of an “adverse amendment” deserves further discussion.
While I have developed the term and referenced it for a purpose, I should
now discuss just what such a phrase means and the significance of its
use. To whom is an “adverse amendment” adverse? It is certainly
adverse to those who oppose it. Is it adverse to Congress, or to the
Supreme Court? Is it adverse to the Federal government or to the States?
Or is it in fact adverse to the people themselves? Should an amendment
be termed “adverse” based on its political content, or more based on the
process that enabled it to come into being?
If political ideology itself is not the basis for determining an
amendment to be “adverse,” then what democratic amendment, ratified
by three-fourths of the state legislatures, can or should rightly be termed
adverse in any instance? Unanswered questions in this arena abound. If it
is adverse even when ratified by three-fourths, is it still adverse if ratified
by four-fifths, or by every state legislature? It seems that the line
between individual rights and democratic rule was determined by the
early framers to be at a three-fourths level of ratification. Under a
republican government, which amendments favored by a super-majority
of the people should the people be allowed to have? Have we now
moved to a system of jurisprudence not only acquiescing to judicial
amendments but actually favoring them? How can a system of
constitutional government “by the people, for the people, and of the
people” remain democratic when constitutional action taken by the States
and the people, such as an Article V Convention, is not only restrained,
but also loathed? Is a democracy that appeals to the government to
protect the Constitution from the people safer than one that appeals to the
people to protect the Constitution from the government? Rarely is any
government in better form than are its people in their character, but there
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are many occasions when the people are much better than their current
form of government.
Without delving into a detailed review of minority and majority
rights, the point is that, depending on the definition of an “adverse
amendment,” one may favor an Article V convention for political values
more aligned with the substantive view of the States and the people, or
for political values more aligned with the procedural view of selfgovernment. Those defining any “adverse amendment” as one not
consistent with simple notions of self-government, albeit with
appropriate respect for minority rights, are likely to find substantially
higher risk of an adverse amendment through the judiciary than with the
States and the people. In either case, whether one’s view is primarily
substantively or procedurally based, the precise reason for individuals
fearing or favoring an Article V convention should be segregated, since
the implications are significant and inescapable on both substantive and
procedural fronts.
VII. FEAR OF ANY AMENDMENT
Another fear of an Article V convention comes from those who are
afraid it would succeed. That is, they believe it would successfully
propose necessary amendments which would then be ratified by threefourths of the States. The cause of this fear, however, is in the definition
of a “necessary amendment.” To this group, no amendment is necessary.
This position is taken irrespective of the substance of the amendment. It
is a blind, total rejection of any amending of the Constitution. It is
sometimes advocated even on religious grounds.
The weaknesses in this position are that it is (1) substantively blind,
(2) inherently contradictory, and (3) rationally inconsistent with the
existence of judicial amendments. First, to reject all amendments,
regardless of substance, is to presuppose a static nature to society,
technology, and the world itself. Those opposing an Article V convention
as but one means of opposing any amendment assume that the original
language can be stretched and applied to fit all evolving circumstances.
On the one hand they favor judicial application of original intent to
evolving circumstances in a conservative but elastic way, while on the
other hand they eschew judicial amendments as having gone too far.
Thus they hold an unrealistic expectation that original intent should be
applied, but at the same time original intent must be stretched to
accommodate a changing nation and society (e.g., revolutions in
telecommunications, transportation, and technologies). Yet they hold that
in no case should the Constitution actually be amended, either
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democratically or “judicially.”
Furthermore, the religious belief some espouse is internally
inconsistent as well. Holding the Constitution to be divinely inspired,
they nonetheless reject all provisions and purposes within the
Constitution for its amendment, as well as any possible virtue to an
Article V convention itself. Consequently, in their view, the document is
inspired, but with exceptions, namely Article V, and the Bill of Rights.
Everything else, in their view, was definitely inspired.
Those who advocate opposition to all democratic amendments in the
face of judicial amendments defy reason. Even if it is believed that the
Constitution should never be amended, if it is amended, one would
expect a desire to change it back. Most judicial amendments can only be
changed, if ever, by a democratic amendment. The second, democratic
amendment simply reverses the effect of the judicial amendment—
actually drawing closer to the position desired by those who initially
reject all amendments. Opposing democratic amendments, including
those from an Article V convention, in the face of regular and ongoing
judicial amendments, comports with no rationally consistent set of
beliefs. It simply defies all reasoning.
The religious opposition to an Article V convention is often masked
behind other grounds, ostensibly more acceptable to defend. The
emptiness of the view is easily revealed, however, by first identifying
whether any amendment for any reason, whether judicial or democratic,
is acceptable. If not, then the alleged fear of an Article V convention can
be easily dismissed as simply a redecorated position which, in reality
opposes all amendments all the time regardless of how proposed.
VIII. FEAR OF THE PEOPLE
Lastly, there are those who selectively favor amending the
Constitution, who prefer it to be done democratically, but fear the people.
The sum of their position is that an Article V convention should not be
held because the first Congressional filter is essential. As already
discussed, this position only makes sense, if at all, when the amendment
process is limited to the methods described in Article V and excludes the
possibility of “judicial amendment.” The filterless ability of the Supreme
Court to amend the Constitution renders this track of analysis moot. The
choice is not whether to preserve a two-filter system, which no longer
exists. Rather, the choice is between which body should have ratifying
authority over any amendment—the Supreme Court or the States? If an
Article V convention also restricts some undesirable amendments from
being voted on, then all the better. But if not, the result is inconsequential

407]

FEAR OF AN ARTICLE V CONVENTION

419

in the face of the Supreme Court’s apparent ability to ratify myriad
litigant-proposed amendments.
Still, some choose this course of reasoning because in the end they
conclude that the wisdom of the Supreme Court justices really is
preferable to the gullibility of the American people.9 However, a simple
survey of the American people’s view of potential amendments will give
a clear indication of just how “gullible” they are, or are not. These survey
results10 directly challenge the assumption that a convention could lead
to a radical restructuring of the Bill of Rights. The argument is simply
political fiction, but has for years been a powerful rallying point for those
opposing a convention. The survey shows a current snap-shot view of
where the American people stand on assorted amendment possibilities,
and leave to those questioning the voters’ intelligence to explain how and
when a sudden dramatic shift will occur.
IX. SURVEY OF AMERICAN VIEWS ON U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS
While the survey, scientific in its exposé of where the voters
currently stand, certainly does not foreclose shifts in voter sentiments, it
does nonetheless reveal as largely political fear-mongering the position
of those suggesting American voters and their state legislators are even
remotely likely to vitiate cherished constitutional rights. If such farfetched fears are not extinguished, at a minimum the burden of proof
powerfully shifts to the fearful to provide any credible evidence their
cherished phobia is rooted in reality. The fear itself seems to entirely
discount our vibrant free-speech society which would adamantly oppose
such changes. Furthermore, it affronts the basic underpinnings of AngloAmerican constitutional government as expressed by George
Washington, “[t]he Constitution—its only keepers, the People.” When
the voice of the people is feared, democracies die. In the end, the
Constitution is as much about the people and the process as it is about
any particular provision. The importance of people choosing in a
democracy was warned of by statesman Ezra Taft Benson, who said, “To
all who have discerning eyes, it is apparent that the republican form of
government established by our noble forefathers cannot long endure once
fundamental principles are abandoned . . . . The issue is . . . will men be
free to determine their own course of action or must they be coerced?”11

9. See Appendix A.
10. See Appendix A.
11. EZRA TAFT BENSON, THE CONSTITUTION: A HEAVENLY BANNER 31 (1986).
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X. FEAR OF A POWER SHIFT
Given that the Constitution is the “highest law of the land,”12 any
change in the amendment process potentially shifts significant power.
The convening of an Article V convention would significantly rupture
the current allocation of governmental powers. The activation of a Statebased method of amending the Constitution strips Congress of what, in
practice, has been its exclusive domain. The power-shift over the years
from the States to the Federal government has been gradual but
significant.13 The Tenth Amendment, not surprisingly, has been whittled
throughout this process to a mostly hollow shell,14 devoid of anything
near the reservation of power to the States and the People its language
intuitively implies.
The Supreme Court is openly acknowledged as the Supreme Branch.
The relationship which has evolved between the Judiciary, Legislative,
and Executive branches has resulted in almost no post-facto check on
decisions by the Court. While the Supreme Court’s constitutional
authority is not completely unfettered, in combination with a meaningful
minority in the Senate, it is practically so.
The convening of a convention of the States would thus rupture longstanding and respected allocations of core power in this country. It would
inevitably lead to a major shift in constitutional power from the federal
government to the States—both immediately and prospectively as the
States reenter the negotiations on future constitutional issues. The power
of a minority of senators will become limited, and particularly less
significant in matters of deep emotional interest to the people. Most of
all, the Supreme Court will lose its untouchable status on constitutional
issues. While it is unclear whether a convention would deal only with
substantive issues important to the States and the people, or will address
the core judicial activism issue itself, in either instance the power of the
Supreme Court to amend the Constitution in a very unpopular way, while
safely protected on their political flank by a minority of senators, will be
stripped forever.
The net effect of an idling Article V state-based convention authority
has been to feed an ever-growing federal government by shifting
significant authority from the states to Washington. This has also created,

12. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
13. See KENNETH R. THOMAS, FEDERALISM, STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE CONSTITUTION:
BASIS AND LIMITS OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER (Congressional Research Service 2005), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30315.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
14. See, e.g., id. at 21 (reviewing recent Supreme Court decisions strengthening state
sovereignty).
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greater distance between decisions of democracy and the people, and
enabled judicial activism to take root, bloom, and grow unchecked by the
ultimate authority and right of the people and the states to self
government. Article V was intended to prevent just such a runaway
federal government and its many attendant evils.15
This inevitable shift in power has been predictable and remains a
certain basis for fear—political fear—of an Article V convention.
However, few if any affected are likely to articulate their fear in terms of
a power loss. As with those who oppose any amendment, the rationale of
those in power who fear the States’ exercise of their Article V
amendment power should be viewed with suspicion. So likewise should
those who seem particularly dependent on judicial amendments as a
substitute for political success in the traditional democratic process be
suspect.
XI. EXTRA-ARTICLE V CONVENTION FEARS
The fears discussed so far relate to an Article V convention. Some
fears, however, are more appropriately classified as “common law
convention fears.”16 That is, they represent fears of what a convention
might or might not have authority to do notwithstanding the language of
Article V. Given the probability analysis above, however, fears regarding
how a convention might act and propose amendments is rendered largely
inconsequential. That is, accepting and measuring the risks of a runaway
convention has already been factored in.
The only fear not already considered or measured is the fear that a
convention, despite the clear language of Article V, might change the
ratification requirements, thus rendering the above analysis incomplete.17
15. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 85 (Alexander Hamilton) (highlighting this check and
balance between the state and the federal governments).
16. This phrase is intended to capture fears attributed to the inherent power of a convention
that may be either not spoken to or directly contradicted by Article V. This mostly undefined body of
authority is often cited as a basis to fear a convention even when Article V specifies means or limits
preventing the evil hypothesized.
17. See, e.g., CON CON: Playing Russian Roulette with the Constitution, PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY
REP., Dec. 1984, available at http://www.eagleforum.org/psr/1984/dec84/psrdec84.html (“None of
[the eight postulated] ‘checks’ [to prevent a runaway constitutional convention] stands up as a
safeguard in which we can place any confidence. . . . [The eighth safeguard is that t]hirty-eight states
must ratify. That is not necessarily true. A runaway [constitutional convention] could change the
ratification requirements (as the 1787 Constitutional Convention did). Also, Article V gives
Congress the power to specify that state ratifications must take place by conventions, thereby
bypassing the State Legislatures altogether.”); see also Robert W. Lee, Battling for the Constitution,
JOHN BIRCH SOCIETY, Apr. 26, 1999, http://www.jbs.org/artman/publish/article_194.shtml (quoting
the 1911 assertion of Senator Heyburn of Idaho that “[w]hen the people of the United States meet in
a constitutional convention there is no power to limit their action. They are greater than the
Constitution, and they can repeal the provision that limits the right of amendment. They can repeal
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Even these fears, however, when examined with greater scrutiny, reveal
their weak underpinning. There are several reasons why.
First, the suggestion that the founding convention changed the
ratification requirements is unwarranted. It would be more accurate to
say that they proposed that Congress change the ratification
requirements.18 There is nothing in the action of the convention which
presumed to unilaterally, without Congressional action, alter the
ratification requirement of the Articles of Confederation from unanimous
approval by the thirteen states to require only nine. It is not that Article
VII of the drafted constitution didn’t make a change—it did. It’s that in
doing so, the Convention fully recognized that only Congress could, with
authority, present the change in ratification to the States. In his final
speech to the Convention, Benjamin Franklin plainly referred to the fact
that their action was subject both to congressional approval and
ratification by the states.19 The subsequent debate in Congress evidenced
the same view as well.20
every section of it because they are the peers of the people who made it.”). Senator Heyburn, like
many others, clearly confuses the power to propose changes with the power to make changes. Id.
There is no American experience with the latter, and recorded history shows the former was clearly
contingent on both affirmative congressional and state action.
18. See INDEX: JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789 (Kenneth E. Harris
& Steven D. Tilley eds., 1976). The Journals of Congress record the debate that ensued September
26 and 27, 1787, when the Constitution was reported back by the original convention to the
Continental Congress for action. The record clearly shows that (1) no one suggested that the
convention’s draft of the Constitution was an authoritative change to the Articles of Confederation—
all recognized it as merely a proposal; (2) no one suggested that the convention action was
authoritative and binding without Congressional action—all the debate centered around the decision
of whether Congress should vote to pass the draft Constitution onto the states, and whether to do so
with or without an affirmative or negative endorsement; (3) there was debate threatening to vote
against such action; and (4) there was consideration of whether the convention properly had
authority to propose a change in the ratification requirements.
The debate centered around two distinguishable propositions: (1) should the Congress endorse,
disapprove, find the lacked authority to do either, or remain silent regarding their own view of the
merits of the new Constitution; and (2), should they vote to transmit the new Constitution to the
states for ratification in its entirety, part by part as they saw fit, with or without additional
amendments, whether such amendments would be advisory only, and whether Congress must act
upon identical language to that of the Convention. In the end, issues were resolved by rejecting all
options except to remain silent, and transmit the new Constitution to the States for ratification, only
in the whole, without any amendments, and with the identical language of the Convention left in
place. These decisions, embodied in the final resolution which passed, caused an earlier proposed
finding that Congress lacked authority to either endorse or oppose the draft Constitution because of
the change in ratification requirements to fail. And no amendment of any kind, including one which
might change back the ratification requirement from nine to thirteen, to ever be offered or
considered.
19. James Madison, Monday Sept. 17, 1787, in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 641 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
20. James Madison specifically hypothesized the result of any congressional amendment to
the draft, arguing that while the Convention directly represented the People, a Congressional
amendment would fatally destroy prospects for ratification. He suggested that Congress had the
authority to do so, but that an amendment “excludes [the] Convention entirely” because the result
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So the Convention didn’t change the ratification requirement, it
simply proposed a change to Congress, who authorized consideration of
the change to the States21 where nine states ultimately agreed.22 So the
scope of the fear based on precedence should not be that a convention
itself might change the ratification requirements, but that Congress might
endorse a proposed change in such requirements.
Furthermore, Article V retains Congressional control over the
ratification procedure itself. Again it is typically suggested that Congress
chooses the mode of ratification, whether it be by state legislature or by
state convention. This also is inaccurate—or at least incomplete—since
Article V states, in relevant part, that,
The Congress . . . shall propose amendments to this Constitution,
or . . . shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either
case, shall be valid . . . when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths
of the several states, or by conventions in three fourths thereof, as the
one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the
Congress . . . .23
The authority given Congress is not only to specify whether state
legislatures or state conventions ratify an amendment, but whether
“legislatures of three fourths of the several states” or “conventions in
three fourths thereof” shall perform the ratification. Congress not only
specifies the body to ratify, but the required level of ratification as
well—set at three fourths.
There is no judicial precedent to suggest that the States, already
bound by constitutional agreement one to another, have the authority to
abrogate that agreement by their own action without the consent of the
Congress. Congress consented then, and it would have to consent now, to

would then not be a dual act of both groups, and the result would “[confine] the House in the
trammels of the Confederation.” See THE FOUNDER’S CONSTITUTION, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, Doc. 12 (Univ.
of Chicago Press), at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch6s12.html.
This very negative assessment seems to foreclose the obvious alternative of simply bypassing
Congress altogether and submitting the draft Constitution directly to the States, should that in fact
have been an option. No one directly or indirectly suggested it was. This apparent view of Madison
matches with the representation of Richard Henry Lee, that “It is admitted and [a] fact that this
[Constitution] was to be sent to Congress . . . .” See id. In all the rough and tumble of debate, no one
suggested in either word or deed that the Convention had a direct route to state ratification bypassing
Congress. At every step of the way Congressional action transmitting the new Constitution to the
States for ratification, with or without endorsement, was considered a required step and became the
object of substantial debate.
21. See INDEX: JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789 (Kenneth E. Harris
& Steven D. Tilley eds., 1976).
22. Eleven states, all but North Carolina and Rhode Island, actually ratified the Constitution
before Congress acted upon the ratifications on September 13, 1788, and began forming the new
government.
23. U.S. CONST. art. V.
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any future change. In fact, Congress could choose to withhold
specification of the means of ratification until after an Article V
convention actually proposes an amendment. While they must specify a
means, there is no requirement that they do so in advance, nor have they
done so in advance of proposing amendments themselves. By
withholding specification of the ratification method until after an
amendment is proposed, they thus retain the authority, granted by the
language of Article V to reject fully any change in the ratification
process.
The fear, if any, should then rightfully be directed towards Congress,
which, given the significant loss of exclusive power to propose
democratic amendments, is unlikely to appease generously any such
change proposed by the States. The fear that a convention would change
the ratification requirements thus neglects the evidence of history, defies
the express language of Article V, and is based on an un-cited and
unprecedented view of common law convention authority never before
exercised in our nation’s history.
In fact, to be historically accurate, the proposed Constitution together
with the Bill of Rights was ultimately ratified by all thirteen States—just
as required by Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation.24 So in any
instance the debate is moot. The real issue, is the validity of the
Constitution between the time it was ratified by New Hampshire (the
ninth) and Rhode Island (the thirteenth).
XII. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
While the Convention did not act unilaterally or change the
ratification requirement itself, there remains a related but different
question of whether Congress had the authority to do what it did—both
in sending the draft Constitution to the states for ratification, and in
forming the new government once nine states had ratified the same.
Whether Congress, upon recommendation of the Convention and the
approval of nine states, had authority to change the ratification
requirement under Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation was itself
a justiciable constitutional issue, subject to the review of the highest
court in the land. The highest court in the land at the time could decide
with finality, once and for all, whether such action was constitutional
under the Articles of Confederation or not. According to Article XIII
itself, however, the highest judicial body, or court of law, was the
Congress itself: “Every State shall abide by the determination of the

24. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII.
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United States in Congress assembled, on all questions which by this
confederation are submitted to them.”25 In addition to exercising their
legislative authority to review the proposed ratification change by the
Convention, the Congress could—and did—act as judge and jury on the
issue in exercise of their plenary judicial authority as well.
The motion and charge against the ratification change was made by
Richard Henry Lee, and seconded by Melancton Smith. The question
submitted to the Congress was whether it had authority under the
Articles of Confederation, Article XIII, to facilitate creation of a new
confederacy of nine states, or whether its authority was limited to merely
amending the Articles by the unanimous approval of all thirteen states.
Specifically, the Congressional Court was asked to “find that the said
Constitution in the thirteenth article thereof limits the power of Congress
to the amendment of the present Confederacy of thirteen states, but does
not extend it to the creation of a new confederacy of nine states.”26
With whatever limited debate that occurred, those arguing in favor of
the congressional power to facilitate a confederacy of just nine states by
state ratification made a motion to effectively dismiss the case by
postponing its consideration. They prevailed, and the motion and charge
against the ratification requirement change was lost.
That position of the Congressional Court was followed later when
Congress, upon ratification by nine states and further joined in the debate
interim by two more states, exercised the very authority questioned by
Lee and Smith. Thus on September 13, 1788, Congress proceeded to
form the new government under the new Constitution.27
25. Id. Without separate branches of government, the Articles vested Congress with both
legislative and judicial responsibility and authority.
26. INDEX: JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789 (Kenneth E. Harris &
Steven D. Tilley eds., 1976) (citing PAPERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, No. 36, III, at 377
(September 26, 1787 notes of Richard Henry Lee)).
27. The resolution authorizing the formation of the new government, following months of
debate (mostly over where the new government should be headquartered) was finally approved by
Congress on September 13, 1788, as recorded in the Journals of Congress: “So it was resolved as
follows,
Whereas the Convention assembled in Philadelphia pursuant to the resolution of
Congress of the 21st of Feby, 1787 did on the 17th of Sept of the same year report to the
United States in Congress assembled a constitution for the people of the United States,
whereupon Congress on the 28 of the same Sept did resolve unanimously ‘That the said
report with the resolutions and letter accompanying the same be transmitted to the several
legislatures in order to be submitted to a convention of Delegates chosen in each state by
[The following resolution on the organization of the government under the Constitution
was entered by Benjamin Bankson in Ratifications of the Constitution, pp. 180-181.
Broadsides of this resolution, signed by Charles Thomson, are in Papers of the
Continental Congress, Broadsides.] the people thereof in conformity to the resolves of the
convention made and provided in that case’ And whereas the constitution so reported by
the Convention and by Congress transmitted to the several legislatures has been ratified
in the manner therein declared to be sufficient for the establishment of the same and such
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The judgment rendered by the Congressional Court was clearly
permissive of the ratification change, notwithstanding the contrary
motion of Lee and Smith. Whether the decision was a well-reasoned
interpretation of Article XIII or an overt act of judicial activism can still
be fodder for ongoing debate. What should not be the subject of dispute,
however, is that Congress was vested by the Articles of Confederation
with plenary judicial authority to decide the issue with finality, and that
they did so.28
The Founding Fathers were obviously fortunate to gain such
cooperation from a Congress serving as both the legislative and judicial
branch of government, whereas proponents of a convention today would
be politically foolish to count on such similar support from either, much
less both, the Congress and the Supreme Court.
XIII. RATIFICATION REQUIREMENT SUMMARY
In review, the Convention merely proposed the ratification change—
they did nothing more. Congress, who had authority to reject it, with
either its legislative or judicial authority, instead enabled and ultimately
endorsed it as an exercise of both. Even if the judicial authority of
Congress under Article XIII were somehow challenged, the outer edge of
those arguing against the ratification is that the Congress, who was
revolutionary in 1776, was in a slight degree still so in 1788, and that the
revolution was actually two-step as opposed to one-step. None of these
positions imperil or impugn the authority or actions of the Convention
then, nor provide a basis for fearing the actions of another convention
today.
Finally, it is important to note that the impetus for even proposing a
change in the ratification process is vastly different from then until now.
All democratic constitutions historically are based on the notion of supermajority consent. Changing ratification from 100% to 75% still accepted
the premise of a required super-majority. To what would a convention
today change the standard? To fifty-one percent? To two thirds? Why
ratifications duly authenticated have been received by Congress and are filed in the
Office of the Secretary therefore Resolved That the first Wednesday in Jany next be the
day for appointing Electors in the several states, which before the said day shall have
ratified the said constitution; that the first Wednesday in feby next be the day for the
electors to assemble in their respective states and vote for a president; and that the first
Wednesday in March next be the time and the present seat of Congress the place for
commencing proceedings under the said constitution.
28. Those challenging this result have mistakenly turned their focus on the Convention itself
for proposing the change, rather than on Congress for at least twice enabling if not endorsing the
ratification change; and in no case have those objecting to the result challenged Congress’ judicial
authority under Article XIII to determine with finality the question.
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would they consider doing so at the risk of having Congress deny even
submitting the amendments to the states under its Article V authority
requiring that they specify the mode of ratification by three fourths or at
the expense of a successfully constructed challenge to the amendment’s
validity presented to a Supreme Court most disgorged of power by the
process? All this—as well as the potential scorn of the States and the
people themselves—would be engaged merely to reduce the ratifying
requirement from, let us suppose, 38 (three fourths) to 34 (two thirds),
and necessarily undertaken at the very outset of the amendment process
rather than at the tail end when their inability to secure the final four
ratification votes is most likely to be ascertained.
Not only would a proposed change in the ratification standard
require the assent of both Congress and the Supreme Court, but it would
also entail a political gamble vastly more risky than that encompassed in
the actions of the original convention.
XIV. CONCLUSION
There are several fears of an Article V convention, but only one—a
straight forward political fear—appears rational. The most predominant
fear is that it will “run away,” but as indicated and measured with
probability theory above, such an event is inconsequential given the
reality of our three-pronged method for amending the Constitution. It is
feared by those who do not want to see any amendment to the
Constitution, and those who criticize an Article V convention out of
concern that, in fact, it could succeed, even to the extent of opposing
democratic amendments simply reversing judicial amendments. It is
feared by those who do want to amend the Constitution as needed, but
believe the gullibility of the American people is such that cherished
Constitutional freedoms would be lost. This group ignores current
political reality, as shown in Appendix A, that no such public sentiment
is anywhere on the horizon. They premise their position, even in the
advent of free speech, talk radio, internet, and multiple electronic and
paper media outlets, upon the idea that the wisdom of the Supreme Court
is more secure than the heart of the American voter. They premise their
defense of democracy and Constitutional rights not in the people but in
its highest instruments of government—a patronizing, parental, and
insulting approach to democracy, eerily reminiscent of theories
underlying governments of remarkably less freedom.
There are those who fear an Article V convention because of the
shift in power it will inevitably produce away from the federal
government and particularly the Supreme Court back to the States. There
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are also those who oppose the convention, whether Article V or
otherwise, because of the prospect that the ratification requirements
might be changed in a convention contrary to the specific language of
Article V. In doing so, however, they misread convention history as
changing the ratification standard unilaterally as opposed to
recommending that Congress and the States do so. The Congress, in
exercise of both its legislative and judicial powers under the Articles of
Confederation to determine “all questions . . . submitted to them,”
including this one, decided to assent to the change being considered and
voted upon by the states—all of whom over time ratified both the change
as well as the Constitution, and ultimately fully satisfying the
requirement of unanimous ratification anyway.
The likelihood of a change in ratification requirements today is quite
remote given the gap in interests between the States and Congress and
the Supreme Court which would, by precedent, be the necessary
determiners of the question. Furthermore, Congress can simply veto the
submission to the States of an amendment with a purported change in
ratification standards under existing Article V language. The legal and
political barriers to such a change today are thus formidable.
There is, however, one supportable reason to oppose an Article V
convention—if one prefers the political leaning of the judiciary to that of
the States. This is the only rational reason under the current
circumstances. Conversely, those who favor vesting or exercising the
already vested amendment power in the States, and those who prefer and
trust their political leanings more than those of the judiciary, should be
among an Article V convention’s greatest advocates. They clearly have
the most to gain.
One thing is for certain: An Article V convention will produce
political winners and political losers. It will be a monumental battle for
authority and power in this country. It can reshape the future course of
our nation and the Constitution as we now know it. It seems to have
predictable and persuasive potential for favoring States’ rights and the
more conservative state agendas. It is, practically speaking, the only
viable means of checking judicial activism. Richard Wirthlin, long-time
political strategist and aid to President Ronald Reagan calls the Article V
convention approach—as it relates to the issue of a federal marriage
amendment—”cleaner, more manageable, and somewhat more likely to
succeed than attempting to push it through Congress.”29
It behooves all scholars, governmental officials, and citizens to re-

29. See Appendix B (Letter from Richard Wirthlin to Arthur H. Taylor, the author, dated
June 6, 2005).
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examine long-held fears of a convention in light of changed
circumstances and identify those that are rational or irrational, and
further distinguish those which are legal from those which are primarily
political in their underpinnings.
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APPENDIX A

National Survey on Constitutional Change*
N=1,000 U.S. adults 18+
Conducted October 28 – November 1, 2005
1. As you may know, a Constitutional Amendment is a change to the
constitution of a nation or a state. Over the years many issues have been
discussed as possible topics for a U.S. Constitutional Amendment. I am
going to read you a number of topics and after each one, please tell me if
you FAVOR or OPPOSE the proposed Constitutional Amendment. The
first one is . . .
A. To place term limits on how long U.S. Senators or members of
Congress can serve
71%
46%
25%
23%
12%
11%
6%

FAVOR (NET)
Strongly favor
Somewhat favor
OPPOSE (NET)
Strongly oppose
Somewhat oppose
Not sure/Refused

B. To ban abortion except to save the life of the woman
41%
30%
12%
52%
39%
13%
7%

*

FAVOR (NET)
Strongly favor
Somewhat favor
OPPOSE (NET)
Strongly oppose
Somewhat oppose
Not sure/Refused

© 2005, Harris Interactive Inc. All rights reserved.
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C. To define marriage in all states to be a union between a man and a
woman
64%
56%
8%
32%
22%
10%
4%

FAVOR (NET)
Strongly favor
Somewhat favor
OPPOSE (NET)
Strongly oppose
Somewhat oppose
Not sure/Refused

D. To specifically permit prayer at school meetings and ceremonies
67%
49%
18%
29%
18%
11%
4%

FAVOR (NET)
Strongly favor
Somewhat favor
OPPOSE (NET)
Strongly oppose
Somewhat oppose
Not sure/Refused

E. To allow non natural-born citizens to become President if they
have been a citizen for 20 years
39%
14%
25%
55%
37%
18%
7%

FAVOR (NET)
Strongly favor
Somewhat favor
OPPOSE (NET)
Strongly oppose
Somewhat oppose
Not sure/Refused

F. To specifically allow Congress to regulate the amount of personal
funds a candidate for public office can spend in a campaign
65%
44%
21%
29%
15%
14%
6%

FAVOR (NET)
Strongly favor
Somewhat favor
OPPOSE (NET)
Strongly oppose
Somewhat oppose
Not sure/Refused
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G. To ban the burning of a U.S. flag
49%
40%
9%
45%
32%
13%
6%

FAVOR (NET)
Strongly favor
Somewhat favor
OPPOSE (NET)
Strongly oppose
Somewhat oppose
Not sure/Refused

H. To lower the drinking age to 18 years old
23%
12%
10%
75%
64%
11%
2%

FAVOR (NET)
Strongly favor
Somewhat favor
OPPOSE (NET)
Strongly oppose
Somewhat oppose
Not sure/Refused

I. To require the U.S. Congress and President to always adopt a
balanced budget
76%
49%
27%
18%
8%
11%
6%

FAVOR (NET)
Strongly favor
Somewhat favor
OPPOSE (NET)
Strongly oppose
Somewhat oppose
Not sure/Refused

J. To limit or prohibit citizens from owning certain types of guns
52%
36%
16%
44%
31%
13%
5%

FAVOR (NET)
Strongly favor
Somewhat favor
OPPOSE (NET)
Strongly oppose
Somewhat oppose
Not sure/Refused
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K. To prohibit Congress from passing any laws affecting state
governments unless they provide the funding required to pay for
those laws
69%
42%
27%
22%
10%
12%
9%

FAVOR (NET)
Strongly favor
Somewhat favor
OPPOSE (NET)
Strongly oppose
Somewhat oppose
Not sure/Refused

L. To require that judges interpret the laws and not write them
74%
56%
18%
20%
11%
9%
7%

FAVOR (NET)
Strongly favor
Somewhat favor
OPPOSE (NET)
Strongly oppose
Somewhat oppose
Not sure/Refused

M. To replace the Bill of Rights with an internationally recognized
set of citizen standards
13%
5%
8%
78%
61%
16%
9%

FAVOR (NET)
Strongly favor
Somewhat favor
OPPOSE (NET)
Strongly oppose
Somewhat oppose
Not sure/Refused

2. Which ONE of these topics do you FAVOR the MOST?
14%
14%
13%
10%
9%
7%
5%

Permit school prayer
Ban abortion
Protect marriage between a man and a woman
Gun ownership restrictions
Require a balanced Federal budget
Require judges to interpret the laws and not write them
Lower the drinking age to 18 years old

434

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW
4%
4%
4%
4%
2%
2%
8%

[Volume 20

Make Congress fund the laws they pass that affect state
governments
Congressional term limits
Ban flag burning
Campaign finance limits
Allow foreign-born citizens to become President
Replace the Bill of Rights
NOT SURE/NONE OF THESE/REFUSED

3. Which ONE of these topics do you OPPOSE the MOST?
18%
18%
14%
9%
8%
8%
4%
3%
3%
2%
2%
1%
1%
8%

Ban abortion
Lower the drinking age to 18 years old
Replace the Bill of Rights
Allow foreign-born citizens to become President
Gun ownership restrictions
Protect marriage between a man and a woman
Ban flag burning
Require judges to interpret the laws and not write them
Permit school prayer
Make Congress fund the laws they pass that affect state
governments
Require a balanced Federal budget
Congressional term limits
Campaign finance limits
NOT SURE/NONE OF THESE/REFUSED

4. As you also might know, there are two different methods of
approaching a U.S. Constitutional Amendment. One way is for a bill to
pass both the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives. The second
method is for a Constitutional Convention to be called by the state
legislatures, and for that Convention to propose one or more
amendments.
Regardless of which of the two methods are used, the amendment still
must be approved by three-fourths of the states. If you favor an
amendment do you prefer that it is proposed by Congress, by a
Convention, or does it not matter to you?
60%
23%

No preference/Does not matter
Prefer Congress

407]

FEAR OF AN ARTICLE V CONVENTION
12%
5%
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Prefer Convention
Not sure/Refused

5. As you may know, a Constitutional Convention to amend the U.S.
Constitution has never previously been called. Just based on this
information, do you FAVOR or OPPOSE a Convention or does this
information make no difference?
61%
17%
17%
4%

Makes no difference
Favor
Oppose
Not sure/Refused

6. Still thinking about a Convention, I am going to read you the
opinions of two people, let’s call them Smith and Jones. After I read
both statements, please tell me which ONE comes CLOSEST to your
own opinion.
Smith is concerned that a Convention will take up controversial or
extreme issues and allow the participants to propose any amendment
with just over a 50 percent vote of support among participants. For this
reason he OPPOSES a Convention.
Jones says that it doesn’t matter what topics are discussed or what
amendments are proposed because any amendment still requires the vote
of three-fourths of the state legislatures in order to become law. He
FAVORS a Convention as the only way to allow important and needed
Constitutional Amendments to be voted on by the states.
Is your opinion closer to . . .
54%
36%
10%

Jones, you favor a Convention
Smith, you oppose a Convention
Not sure/Refused
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7. Recalling that three-fourths of the state legislatures must still
approve any amendment to the U.S. Constitution before it actually
becomes law, do you still OPPOSE a Convention, are you more
undecided, or do you now FAVOR a Convention?
Base: Oppose Convention (Smith) (n=361)
44% Still oppose a Convention
43% More undecided
9%
Now favor a Convention
5%
Not sure/Refused
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